Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 40

Issue 2

Article 6

1974

Case Notes
Peter B. Heister
Charles Bennett Lord
Martin C. Ruegsegger

Recommended Citation
Peter B. Heister et al., Case Notes, 40 J. AIR L. & COM. 309 (1974)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol40/iss2/6

This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For
more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

1974]

CASE NOTES

reasonableness by considering the exigency of hijacking under facts
not warranting the application of that test. There is simply no hijacking threat when the suspect is not attempting to board an air-

plane. Furthermore, in its consideration of the threat of hijacking,
the court permitted minimal self-verification of an anonymous tip
to create the reasonable suspicion required to justify taking Migdall
into custody. Without the threat of hijacking, the reasonable suspicion would have been reduced to "mere" suspicion and a resulting determination that such an extensive stop was illegal.
William P. Bowers

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT-State Law Relating to Sale of Alcoholic Beverages Applies
to AMTRAK. National R.R. Passenger Corp v. Miller, 358 F.
Supp. 1321 (D.C. Kan. 1973), afl'd., 414 U.S. 948 (1973). National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Harris, 354 F. Supp. 887 (W.D.
Okla. 1972), rev'd, 490 F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 1974).
On July 18, 1972, an AMTRAK train, en route from Chicago,
Illinois, to Los Angeles, California, was boarded in Kansas by state
officers who seized its liquor inventory and records. They also arrested the conductor, a lounge car attendant, and a dining car waiter. The seizures and arrests resulted from alleged violations of Kansas statutes which forbid, inter alia, the sale of liquor by the drink.
AMTRAK sought an injunction to restrain defendants from enforcing the statutes arguing they were an undue burden on interstate commerce, an unreasonable exercise of state police power, a
denial of equal protection, and in conflict with the supremacy
clause. Held: For the defendants. Under the twenty-first amendment states have the power to regulate AMTRAK's liquor operations. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Miller, 358 F. Supp. 1321
(D.C. Kan. 1973), afl'd, 414 U.S. 948 (1973).
An identical fact situation occurred in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, on the same date as the Kansas incident when an AMTRAK
train was boarded by state and county officers who confiscated its
liquor and records and arrested the lounge car attendant. AM-
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TRAK sought a declaratory judgment that the Oklahoma laws did
not apply, based on the theories that AMTRAK was under the exclusive control of the federal government, that the state law was an
undue burden on interstate commerce, and that the law was discriminatorily enforced. AMTRAK also requested a permanent injunction to effectuate the decree sought. Held: For AMTRAK. The
liquor operations of AMTRAK do not fall within the twenty-first
amendment. On appeal-Held: For the appellant. Citing the Supreme Court's affirmance in Miller, the Tenth Circuit Court of appeals stated that under the twenty-first amendment states possess
the power to regulate AMTRAK's liquor operations. National R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. Harris, 354 F. Supp. 887 (W.D. Okla. 1972),
rev'd, 490 F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 1974).
The cumulative impact of Miller and Harrisaccentuates the heretofore undefined power conflict between the twenty-first amendment and the commerce clause and arouses related constitutional
considerations. The issues raised and the arguments proffered merit
meticulous scrutiny for not only do they reveal the escalating struggle between two clauses of the Constitution but they also foretell
the outcome of similar litigation should a state attempt to prohibit
the serving of liquor on interstate aircraft.
AMTRAK was created by Congress whose authority to legislate
in the area derives from the commerce clause of the United States
Constitution.' The instigation of this train system stemmed from the
desire to provide modern, efficient, interstate rail passenger service'
which utilized, as part of its service, dining cars and lounge cars
serving liquor. The problem, however, is that the states of Kansas
and Oklahoma, through which AMTRAK travels, prohibit the
sale of liquor by the drink in both their constitutions' and statutes.'

I "The

Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign

Nations, and among the several States ....
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
'Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, 45 U.S.C. §§ 541 et seq., 546 (c), 641
(1970).
KAN. CONST. art. 15, S 10:
. . . [TIhe open saloon shall be and is hereby forever prohibited.
OKLA. CONST. art. 27, § 4:
Prohibition of Open Saloon-Retail Sales by Package StoresRestrictions
The open saloon, for the sale of alcoholic beverage as commonly
known prior to the adoption of the Eighteenth Article of Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America, is hereby
prohibited.
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The state laws of both Kansas and Oklahoma are grounded in section two of the twenty-first amendment of the United States Constitution:
The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.
This provision was intended to assure the dry states that they could
retain that status, unhampered by the repeal of prohibition and unfettered by the commerce clause. As a further guarantee, the control of liquor regulations was deemed primarily the province of the
individual states rather than the federal government. Thus, section
two allows the states, via their police powers, to regulate liquor
free of the congressional commerce power.'
That the states may wield this vast authority over alcoholic beverages has long been acknowledged by the Supreme Court. In Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves the Court specified that:
The Twenty-First Amendment sanctions the right of a State to legislate concerning intoxicating liquors brought from without unfettered by the Commerce Clause.!
The words "open saloon" shall mean:
Any place, public or private, wherein alcoholic beverage is sold
or offered for sale, by the drink; or sold, offered for sale, or kept
for sale, for consumption on the premises.
Retail sales of alcoholic beverage shall be limited to the original
sealed package, by privately owned and operated package stores, in
cities and towns having a population in excess of two hundred....
4
KAN. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 803 (1949):
It shall be unlawful for any person to own, maintain, operate or
conduct either directly or indirectly, an open saloon. For the purposes of this section, the words "open saloon" mean any place, public or private, where alcoholic liquor is sold or offered for sale or
kept for sale by the drink or in any quantity of less than one-half
pint, or sold, offered for sale, or kept for sale for consumption on
the premises where sold.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, § 538 (1961):
(h) Any person who shall violate the open saloon prohibition as defined by Article XXVII of the Oklahoma Constitution shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be punished by a fine
not to exceed Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00), or imprisoned in the
county jail not to exceed six (6) months, or both such fine and imprisonment.
s Comment, The Concept of State Power Under The Twenty-First A mend-

ment, 40 TENN. L. REV. 465, 471-73 (1973). This article also contains an excellent review of the history of the twenty-first amendment.
e308 U.S. 132 (1939).
'Id.

at 138.
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This holding was reiterated in Carter v. Virginia:'
By interpretation of this Court the Amendment has been held to
relieve the states of the limitations of the Commerce Clause over
such transportation or importation."
While it might appear that the twenty-first amendment would consequently be controlling in both Miller and Harris, its power was
circumvented in the latter case. Notwithstanding its subsequent reversal, the conclusions of the Harriscourt expose assumptions about
the dominance of congressional power while simultaneously disparaging the states' plenary power over liquor regulation.
To remove the case from the domain of the twenty-first amendment, the Harris court employed untested versions of two basic
arguments:
(i) Pre-emption
By the enactment of the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 . . .
the Congress ... by the authority of the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution has preempted for the Federal Government exclusive
authority to regulate and control the interstate rail passenger service provided by AMTRAK. ..
(ii) Enclave Exemption
Sale of liquor on the interstate vehicle can logically be compared
to sale within a Federal enclave located within the State of Oklahoma which the State has no power to prohibit."
The basis of the Harriscourt's findings that Congress pre-empted
the regulation of AMTRAK to the exclusion of the states was 54
U.S.C. § 546(c) (1970):
The Corporation shall not be subject to any State or other law pertaining to the transportation of passengers by railroad as it relates
to rates, routes, or service.
The Harris court interpreted the statute as evidencing such pervasive federal regulation that even though no federal statute specifically permitted the sale of liquor on AMTRAK, state control had
6321 U.S. 131 (1944).
Ild. at 137.
10 354 F. Supp. at 892.

Id.
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been pre-empted." In Harris the rationale for pre-emption was the
need for uniformity of services.1 Conversely, the court in Miller,
when confronting an identical fact situation, held that if "service"
is to be construed as including the sale of liquor by the drink, the
statute would be a "clear violation of the Twenty-First Amendment" since there can be no pre-emption of state legislation which
is grounded on the Constitution.' In order to prevent the federal
statute from being declared unconstitutional the Miller court concluded the word "service" must be construed to exclude the serving
of intoxicating liquor in violation of state law.' This interpretation
was based upon the tenet of construction that when a statute is susceptible of a constitutional construction as well as an unconstitutional one, the court will adopt the meaning which will save the
act."
Previous decisions addressing the relation between the twentyfirst amendment and the commerce clause did not involve congressional action; rather, they dealt with the influence of state legislation on interstate commerce. In Heublein, Inc. v. South Carolina
Tax Commission' the Supreme Court indicated that it had never
squarely determined how the twenty-first amendment affects congressional power under the commerce clause." Two theories do
exist, however, that provide guideposts to a plausible resolution.
A court could give the twenty-first amendment the reading approved in California v. LaRue." There it was unsuccessfully argued
that state regulations allowing suspension of a liquor license of a
nightclub with bottomless female entertainers violated the first
amendment." Since the regulations were grounded on the twentyfirst amendment, they were upheld by the Court. Consequently,
LaRue affirmed the state's power to control liquor making its au"' On pre-emption see 2 C. ANTIEAU, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10.24
(1969).
"354 F. Supp. at 892.
' 358 F. Supp. at 1329.
"Id. The Miller court found nothing in the legislative history of the twentyfirst amendment or the federal statute that required another interpretation.
" NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937).
"7409 U.S. 275 (1972).
"1Id.at 282 n.9.
1"409 U.S. 109 (1972).
20 Id. at 123-39 (Marshall J., dissenting).
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thority almost absolute and precluding pre-emption by the federal
government."
A second and seemingly more apropos theory is reflected in Epstein v. Lordi2 and Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor
Corp. 3 both of which explored the interaction of the twenty-first
amendment and the commerce clause. In Hostetter the Court reasoned that the twenty-first amendment and the commerce clause are
such that each must be considered in the light of the other and in
the context of the issues and interests at stake in any given fact
situation; in short, a balancing test becomes mandatory." In Epstein the court read Hostetter as requiring a two-pronged test that
first necessitated a determination of whether the twenty-first amendment applied to the liquor in question (i.e., whether the liquor had
entered the state "for delivery or use therein") while the second
phase called for a case by case weighing of the national interests
protected by the commerce clause and the state interests protected
by the twenty-first amendment.' Whether the state law is pre-empted would thus depend upon an examination of the nature of the
competing interests.
The district court in Harris appears to have relied on the latter
theory: the fact that the liquor sales were made only to bona fide
passengers and that no liquor was served while the trains were momentarily stopped in the stations is emphasized. Additionally, the
effect of liquor sales on the "welfare, health, peace, temperance,
and safety of the citizens of Oklahoma" was not deemed of sufficient consequence to outweigh the need for national uniformity of
service."
In contrast, the Miller court's reliance on the LaRue decision"
leaves little doubt but that it perceived the state's power as being
" Comment, State Power to Regulate Liquor: Section Two of the Twenty-First
Amendment, Reconsidered, 24 SYRACUSE LAW REV. 1131, 1153 (1973). While the

twenty-first amendment does give the states great power in the control of liquor,
this power is not absolute. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971),
where the state statute was found to deny the due process requirements of the
fourteenth amendment.
22261 F. Supp. 921 (D.N.J. 1966).
23 377 U.S. 324 (1964).
24

Id. at 332.

2Epstein v. Lordi, 261 F. Supp. 921, 933 (D.N.J. 1966).
2' 354 F. Supp. at 890, 892-93.
27358 F. Supp. at 1330.
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unequivocal. The Supreme Court's affirmance of the Miller court's
decision without comment 8 clearly reasserts the strength of the
twenty-first amendment. In so doing, the Supreme Court has said,
by implication, that not only were the state laws in question a valid
application of police power but also that liquor cannot be served
on AMTRAK trains in violation of state law since Congress lacks
the power to pass legislation permitting such sales."
The Harris court's second explanation excluding AMTRAK
from the state laws and the twenty-first amendment does not appear
in Miller but it nonetheless requires examination due to its potential impact on interstate airlines. In contending that AMTRAK
trains should be accorded the same status as federal enclaves, 3 the
Harriscourt has produced a neoteric proposition. Federal jurisdiction of areas within a state is based on U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.
17.31 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that where the federal
government has acquired property, either by purchase or by condemnation, and the state has ceded its jurisdiction, the federal government has exclusive control with the exception that the state may
qualify its cession by reservations not inconsistent with government
uses.32 In Johnson v. Yellow Cab Transit Co.33 and again in Collins
v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., the Court reasoned that where
exclusive jurisdiction is in the federal government, the twenty-first
amendment is inapplicable.
30

414 U.S. 948 (1973).
358 F. Supp. at 1329-30.

30 National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Harris, 354 F. Supp. 887, 892 (W.D. Okla.
1972). Although this theory was not advanced in Miller, AMTRAK did raise

the issue of federal instrumentality in that case. The Miller court refused to grant
AMTRAK that status. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Miller, 358 F. Supp. 1321,
1330 (D. Kan. 1973), afl'd, 414 U.S. 948 (1973).

art. 1,§ 8, cl. 17:
[A]nd to exercise like Authority [exclusive legislation] over all Places
purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which
the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals,
dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings; . ...

31U.S. CONST.

'E.g.,

James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 146-47 (1937); Collins

v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518, 528 (1938).
In OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 80, §5 1, 2, 4, 8 (1965), Oklahoma consents to the
purchase or condemnation of any land within the state by the U.S. Government for
the purposes described in the U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 17, and cedes to the U.S.

its jurisdiction. Rights are reserved for service of process and taxation of corporations on military reservations.
33321 U.S. 383 (1943).
- 304 U.S. 518 (1938).
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As with the pre-emption theory, the explication for bestowing
the status of an enclave on AMTRAK is terse. The Harris court
declared:
Sale of liquor on the interstate vehicle can logically be compared to
sale within a Federal enclave located within the State of Oklahoma
which the State has no power to prohibit.... AMTRAK's lounge
cars and aircraft engaged in the interstate transportation of passengers, being Federally regulated vehicles, may well be termed
peripatetic Federal enclaves created by the Congress.'
Two possible interpretations may be given to this declaration.
The Harris court either is affirming that AMTRAK trains are in
fact federal enclaves or is asserting that they are to be accorded the
same status because the logic that applies to federal enclaves should
by analogy apply to AMTRAK. No precedent supports the construction that the trains are a type of federal enclave. Since exclusive federal jurisdiction becomes possible only through the federal ownership of the property, this reading lacks plausibility."
The alternative contention that the trains could logically be compared to enclaves and should consequently be granted identical
standing is logical but equally unprecedented. AMTRAK, though
not a government agency, 7 does possess genuine similarities to such
an agency since it was created by Congress and at least in its inception resembled one. It is controlled by the federal government
and provides a nationwide service. More importantly, the Rail
Passenger Service Act of 1970 allows the Interstate Commerce
Commission to order railroads to allocate tracks and facilities at
the request of AMTRAK conditioned upon just payment." This
provision gives AMTRAK a power akin to condemnation which
results in exclusive federal jurisdiction, absent a reservation. If
AMTRAK can procure for its use the tracks and facilities of private railroads, it possesses what amounts to a property interest
therein. This property interest plus its quasi-governmental character make the enclave theory tenable if somewhat uncomfortable.
Although Harrisdealt only with AMTRAK trains, it is significant
354 F. Supp. at 892.
See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
3745 U.S.C. § 541 (1970) provides: "The Corporation will not be an agency
or establishment of the United States Government."
3845 U.S.C. § 562 (1970).
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that the district court in Harriswould also extend enclave status to
aircraft engaged in interstate transportation.' This gratuitous inclusion of aircraft illuminates potential ramifications of Harris and,
more significantly, of Miller: the possibility of a state's prohibiting
the serving of liquor on interstate aircraft.40
While state air traffic regulations have regularly been deemed invalid where they conflict with federal laws, it is important to note
that this supremacy of federal power is grounded in the commerce
clause' rather than in federal jurisdiction of airspace.4' The federal
control of interstate air traffic as well as federal control of AMTRAK has its basis in the commerce clause-the constitutional
provision which the twenty-first amendment was specifically designed to counteract. "' Thus, any congressional attempt to legalize
the sale of liquor on aircraft based upon the commerce clause
would conflict with Miller, since "before a federal law may preempt
state legislation, the federal statute must be free from constitutional infirmity."" Of equal likelihood is the failure of a pre-emption
argument based on the pervasiveness of federal regulation.
The "peripatetic enclave" argument of Harris did not surface in
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, and thus remains an untested
theory lacking the authority of precedent. In addition, the district
court's effort to extend enclave status to the airlines strains awkwardly under the incongruity of comparing a moving aircraft to
Fort Sill. The problematical matter of ownership also arises; AMTRAK, despite its profit motives, is a creation of Congress whereas
the airlines are purely private organizations. Hence, a dubious label
" 354 F. Supp. at 892.
40
An opinion of the Attorney General of Texas, Apr. 26, 1968, espoused the
position that it was unlawful for an air carrier to sell intoxicating liquor in the
air above Texas, regardless of the point of destination or point of origin of the
flight. 3 Av. L. REP. 5 23,167.
"'Allegheny Airlines v. Village of Cedarhurst, 238 F.2d 812, 814 (2d Cir.
1956).
4' Even though the Supreme Court in City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624, 626-27 (1973) alludes to the notion of complete and exclusive
federal sovereignty in the airspace of the U.S. based on 49 U.S.C. S 1508 (1972),
the Court preferred to rely on the pervasive nature of the federal regulation in

finding pre-emption. One court has specifically held that nothing in 49 U.S.C. S
1508 (1972) indicates an intent to pre-empt the traditional functions of state law
(in this case, tort liability), McEntire v. Estate of Forte, 463 S.W.2d 491, 494
(Tex. Civ. App. 1971), writ ref'd n.r.e.
"See notes 6-9 supra and accompanying text.
358 F. Supp. at 1329.
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attached to vehicles like AMTRAK becomes even more dubious
when attached to interstate aircraft. If a state were to attempt enforcing its liquor laws on interstate aircraft, it seems apparent
that an airline argument employing pre-emption and/or the commerce clause would fail with the "peripatetic enclave" concept offering only marginal comfort.
Nevertheless, the holding in Miller is not necessarily dispositive
since a credible argument for airline autonomy can be derived from
the interpretation of the interaction between the twenty-first amendment and state police power. It can be persuasively argued that
the twenty-first amendment does not grant unlimited power to the
states to regulate liquor since it was designed to prevent the commerce power of Congress from overwhelming state police powers in
this area.' As such it should be seen not as a grant of power but as
a protection of extant authority.' In order to constitute a valid exercise of a state's police power, a statute must bear some rational
relationship to legitimate state purposes. 7 Although the Supreme
Court has shown a degree of deference to state legislatures and to
the validity of state statutes, 8 it has been increasingly willing to
strike down statutes using the reasonableness test.4 Clearly, the difficulty in perceiving any deleterious impact upon the citizens of a
state from liquor sales aboard a moving train increases substantially when applied to such sales aboard an aircraft and arguably
bears no relationship to any legitimate state purpose.
However, it must be recalled that the Court declared in LaRue
that:
[T]he broad sweep of the Twenty-First Amendment has been recognized as conferring something more than the normal state authority over public health, welfare, and morals."
How much "more" is unclear. Perhaps the twenty-first amendment
has evolved into a grant of power to the states distinct from their
" Comment, The Concept of State Power Under The Twenty-First Amendment, 40 TENN. L. REV. 465, 471-73 (1973).
'It must be remembered that the United States Constitution grants powers to
the federal government, not to the states.
""San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, U.S. -,
93 S. Ct.
1278, 1308 (1973).
8 Id.

" Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
50 409 U.S. at 114.
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police powers-a power whose limits are as yet undefined but apparently reached in neither Miller nor Harris.
The Supreme Court's affirmance of Miller accords the states authority to regulate the sale of liquor on AMTRAK and in so doing
spurns the argument for pre-emption. While the "peripatetic enclave" concept of Harris remains untested, it is relevant that this
theory was not raised in Miller or addressed on appeal in the Tenth
Circuit, indicating its uncertain status. Of equal import, however,
are the judicial trends herein examined. Whereas the older decisions refused to permit the circumvention of state liquor laws by
application of the commerce clause,"' more recent decisions seem
reluctant to elevate one provision of the Constitution over another. " Apparently, the states' plenary power to control liquor now
assumes virtually absolute precedence although this preeminence
of state power spawns essential questions concerning its strength
and its limits.
Resolutions to the controversy may eventually be found should
the states attempt to force the airlines to observe their liquor regulations. Since aircraft, like AMTRAK trains, are mobile entities
within state boundaries, they might presumably also be subjected
to local control. The standard arguments for excepting airlines
from state law-burden on interstate commerce and pre-emptionhave been crippled if not destroyed by Miller. In addition, if the
twenty-first amendment is something "more" than police power, a
question exists as to the need to show a valid application of such
power. Though the outcome of such a case remains conjectural,
one factor is predictable: the Supreme Court's affirmance of Miller
as well as the Tenth Circuit's holding in Harris are quantum steps
towards allowing states to regulate the sale of liquor on interstate
aircraft. Currently dormant interest in this area may be due for an
awakening.
Peter B. Heister

'

See notes 6-9 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 22-25 supra and accompanying text.
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CLASS ACTION-MAss ACCIDENT LITIGATION-Class Action
is Appropriate Procedure for the Determination of Severed Liability Issue in Mass Accident Litigation Arising Out of a Mid-Air Collision. Petition of Gabel, 350 F. Supp. 624 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
On June 6, 1971, a collision between an Air West DC-9 jet liner
enroute from Los Angeles and a United States military jet near
Duarte, California, resulted in 50 deaths. Individual tort actions
were filed against the United States, Air West and Lt. Schiess, the
surviving co-pilot of the military jet. The actions remained severed
as to damages but were consolidated on the issue of liability in the
California district court. Glenda Gabel, individually and in her capacity as guardian of her two minor children, petitioned the California district court to try the consolidated tort actions as a class
suit-the class to consist of all persons having a compensable interest as a result of the death of any passenger killed in the collision. Held, so ordered: The severed liability issue from a mass accident arising out of a mid-air collision may be maintained as a
class action when the prerequisites of rule 23 (a)' and 23 (b)' of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are met. Petition of Gabel, 350 F.
Supp. 624 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
Several prominent authorities have maintained that mass accidents are generally inappropriate for class action treatment." The
Federal Rules Advisory Committee in 1966 suggested that a class
suit for personal injury claims might degenerate into multiple, separate suits." Professor Kaplan, the Committee's Reporter, later questioned the "superiority" of a class action when compared with other procedural devices for handling mass accident litigation.'
I FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
"FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
'Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 BUFF.
L. REv. 433, 469 (1960); see also notes 4 & 5 infra.
4 A 'mass accident' resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood
that significant questions, not only of damages but of liability and
defenses to liability, would be present, affecting the individuals in
different ways. In these circumstances an action conducted nominally as a class action would degenerate in practice into multiple
law suits separately tried.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23, Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 103 (1966).
' Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HARv. L. REv. 356, 393 (1967).
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Other authorities, however, challenge the position taken by the
Federal Rules Advisory Committee.' Professor Moore argues that
"class action treatment is particularly strong in cases arising out
of mass disasters such as an airplane crash in which there is little
chance of individual defenses being presented."' Professors Wright
and Miller agree and further state that "the fact that damages may
raise highly individual issues that depend on such factors as the
claimant's age, earning capacity, and other personal considerations,
should not always require the disallowance of a class action (in
mass accident situations)."'
Typically the initial prerequisites of rule 23(a) are satisfied by
a mass accident case. The number of plaintiffs arising from the
common disaster is usually large enough to support a determination
by the court that joinder of all members is impractical.! Furthermore, the number of class members is multiplied when deaths result from a mass accident such as an air crash. By severing the liability issue" and allowing the class members to litigate the issue of
damages in their chosen forums, the prerequisites of common questions of law or fact are met. 1 Finally, it is strictly within the court's
discretion to select the class member who will best represent and
protect the interests of the class.1"
Since the prerequisites of rule 23 (a) are ordinarily satisfied by a
mass accident, it may seem peculiar that comparatively few mass
accident cases have employed the class action device. Prior to the
revision of rule 23 in 1966, however, class actions were not appropriate for mass accident litigation because the rights of all parties,
oSee notes 7 & 8 inf ra.

13B J. MOORE,

'7A

FEDERAL PRACTICE,

23.45(3), at 23-311 n.33 (2d ed. 1969).

C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL

§ 1783, at 117 (1972).

' FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a)(1) provides that the court must determine that the
class isso numerous that joinder of allmembers isimpracticable.
10 See Weinstein, Routine Bifurcation of Jury Negligence Trials: An Example
of the Questionable Use of Rule Making Power, 14 VAND. L. REV. 831 (1961);

9 C. WRIGHT & A.

MILLER,

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:

CIVIL S

2388,

at 279-81 (1971).
"FED. R. Ov. P. 23(a)(2) provides that the court determine that there are
questions of law or fact common to the class. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3) directs
that the court determine that the claims and defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims and defenses of the class.
12FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) directs that the court determine that the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
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including those not before the court, could not be conclusively determined by the class suit. 3 Furthermore, in order for the action to
be tried as a federal class suit under revised federal rule 23, not
only must all the prerequisites in subdivision (a) be satisfied, but
so also must at least one of the categories of subdivision (b)."
Rule 23(b) is comprised of three subdivisions with each subdivision denoting a distinct variety of class suit. Those authorities
who support class action treatment for mass accident litigation
generally agree that only subdivision (b) (3) of rule 23 is appropriate." Subdivision (b) (3) requires that questions common to the
class predominate over any individual questions and that the class
action be superior to any alternative methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.'" A major reason for the parsimonious use of the class action in personal injury tort cases has
been a judicial tradition approving alternative procedures." This
tradition is predicated on arguments concerning the magnitude and
very personal nature of each individual claim. Moreover, the contingent fee concept generally makes it feasible for claimants to obtain attorneys regardless of their financial resources. In rare instances, however, subdivision (b) (3) has been applied to deter" Under the old rule, a mass accident class action was "spurious" and absent
class members were not bound by an adverse judgment. Pennsylvania R.R. v.
United States, Ill F. Supp. 80, 90-92 (D.N.J. 1953).
4
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
"See

notes 7 & 8 supra.

" Only if there is some equally promising alternative can class action treatment ordinarily be denied. Korn v. Franchard Corp., 456 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir.
1972).
" Alternative procedures include: (i) separate individual actions with agreement for "test case" disposition, see Doherty v. Bress, 262 F.2d 20 (D.C. Cir.
1958); (ii) separate individual actions, with pretrial consolidation under 28
U.S.C. 5 1407 (1970), followed by transfer for all purposes under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404 (1970) and consolidation under FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a), see In re Multidistrict Civil Actions Involving Air Crash Disaster Near Hanover, N.H., 342 F.
Supp. 907 (D.N.H. 1971); In re Mid-Air Collision Near Fairland, Ind., 309 F.
Supp. 621 (Jud. Pan. Mult. Lit. 1970); In rc Mid-Air Collision Near Hendersonville, N.C., 297 F. Supp. 1039 (Jud. Pan. Mult. Lit. 1970); (iii) separate individual actions, wih applicaion of expanding concepts of collateral estoppel, see
In re Air Crash Disaster, Dayton, Ohio, 350 F. Supp. 757 (S.D. Ohio 1972);
United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709, 728 (E.D. Wash. &
D. Nev. 1962), af0'd sub nom. United Air Lines, Inc., v. Weiner, 335 F.2d 379
(9th Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed, sub nom. United Air Lines, Inc. v. United

States, 375 U.S. 951 (1964).
" FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (A) directs the court to consider the interest of
members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of
separate actions.
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mine the liability issue in mass accident cases.' All of these early
applications of mass accident class actions have involved only damage to property."
The first case to consider the propriety of the class action to an
air crash mass accident was Hobbs v. Northeast Airlines." In
Hobbs the plaintiff's decedent was one of thirty-two people killed
in a crash of a Northeast Airlines plane in 1968 near Hanover,
New Hampshire. The plaintiff sued Northeast Airlines and Fairchild-Hiller, the plane's manufacturer, in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The defendants impleaded two manufacturers of component parts, and the United
States, as the party exercising control over the airport facilities.
The district court denied the plaintiff's motion to proceed as a class
action under rule 23 (b) (3). Although the district court agreed
with the plaintiffs that the use of the class action device would produce substantial economies in judicial resources and expenses of
trial preparation," it concluded that the plaintiff's choice of forum
was not appropriate for the class as a whole. Only the named plaintiff had any connection with Pennsylvania. The other potential
class members resided in various New England states. The defendants were Massachusetts and Maryland corporations.
The parties in Hobbs were joined for trial in In re Multidistrict
Civil Actions Involving Air Crash Disaster Near Hanover, New
Hampshire." In Hanover the United States District Court for the
District of New Hampshire found that the liability issue was identical for all plaintiffs and all defendants. Additionally, the district
court determined that the convenience of the parties and witnesses
and the interests of justice would best be served by a single trial on
the issue of liability. Therefore, although no party moved for maintenance of the suit as a class action, the district court nevertheless
ordered that the consolidated cases be tried in the same manner as
"'American Trading & Prod. Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 47 F.R.D. 155
(N.D. Ill. 1969); Hall v. Union Oil Co., Civil No. 69-889-ALS (C.D. Cal., filed

May 8, 1969); Masterson v. Union Oil Co., Civil No. 69-331-ALS (C.D. Cal.
filed Feb. 19, 1969).
"See cases cited note 19 supra.

2"50 F.R.D. 76 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
"Id. at 79-80.
"342 F. Supp. 907 (D.N.H. 1971).
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a class action?' The district court viewed the damages issue as distinct for each individual plaintiff, and thus the plaintiffs were not
compelled to litigate the damages issue in the liability forum." The
procedure followed in Hanover indicates that had the plaintiff in
Hobbs sought his class action in New Hampshire, a state with more
substantial contacts with the case," he might have met a more receptive court.
Petition of GabelF is the first mass accident case involving multiple deaths to approve the class action. In Gabel the United States
District Court for the Central District of California determined that
only the liability issue could be determined by reference to a common set of facts. Therefore the district court severed the liability issue for trial as a class action leaving the choice of forum for the
damages issue to each individual plaintiff. By confining the class
action to the liability issue, the district court concluded that the prerequisites of rule 23 (a) were satisfied. The district court determined that (i) it would be impracticable to try the case on the issue of
liability since the class of plaintiffs numbered in excess of 100 with
more than 30 sets of lawyers representing their interests;"' (ii) there
were common questions of law and fact as to liability;"9 (iii) the
claims of all the plaintiffs and likewise the defenses of the United
States, Air West and Lt. Schiess were typical as each had to rely
The cases . . . will be tried in the same manner as a class action.
The plaintiffs' attorneys will determine which of them will try the
case. For purposes of trial, the court considers the appearance of
an attorney in one case as an appearance in all cases. Settlement
prior to trial of the particular case in which the selected trial counsel appears will not bar that attorney from acting as trial' counsel
if plaintiffs desire him to do so.
In re Multidistrict Civil Actions Involving Air Crash Disaster Near Hanover,
N.H., 342 F. Supp. 907, 908 (D.N.H. 1971).
' Two factors that caused the New Hampshire district court to reject trying
the damages issue in its district were: (i) that each plaintiff stood on separate
footing and that the convenience of the parties and witnesses would probably

best be served by trial in the district where the case originated, and (ii)

that

separate trials on damages would impose a sizeable burden on the New Hamp-

shire district and result in the postponement of many cases already scheduled for
trial.
26 The crash occurred in New Hampshire and the cases relating to the crash
had been transferred to the district of New Hampshire under 28 U.S.C. § 1407
(1970) for pretrial consolidation.
27350 F. Supp. 624 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
Id. at 629.
I8
2Id.
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upon the same set of operative facts;"° and (iv) the representative
parties and their counsel would fairly and adequately represent the
class."'
The federal district court in Gabel further qualified the case as a
class action under subdivisions (b) (1) (A), (b) (1) (B) and (b)
(2) of federal rule 23. The Gabel court totally ignored subdivision
(b) (3). This was unusual since the (b) (3) class suit was approved in previous property damage mass accident cases" and was
sought by the plaintiff in Hobbs v. Northeast Airlines.'
In the situation to which subdivision (b) (3) relates, class action treatment is not as clearly called for as in those described in
subdivision (b) (1) or (b) (2), but it may nevertheless be convenient and desirable."4 Subdivision (b) (3) encompasses those
cases in which a class action would achieve economies of time, effort
and expense and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated without sacrificing procedural fairness. Because the
(b) (3) class suit is often more for convenience than for necessity, the (b) (3) class suit provides two procedural safeguards in order to insure due process for each class member. First, the (b) (3)
class suit requires that individual notice be sent to those class members who can be identified3 and, secondly, upon receipt of such
notice a class member may elect to remove himself from the class."
Thereafter any judgment for the class is res judicata only as to those
members of the class who have not elected to remove themselves
from the class. Subdivisions (b) (1) and (b) (2) have no corresponding provisions of notice and removal, but simply provide that
all those whom the court determines to be members of the class are
bound by the decision."
In sustaining the maintenance of the class suit under subdivision
(b) (2), the United States District Court for the District of New
" 0Id. at 629-30.
31 Id.

at 630.
1 See cases cited note 19 supra.

0350 F.R.D. 76 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
3459 AM. JuR. 2d Parties § 66, at 449 (1971).

13 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
36Id.
3

7 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3); see also Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 259 F. Supp.
125 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); accord, Johnson v. City of Baton Rouge, 50 F.R.D. 295

(E.D. La. 1970).
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Hampshire noted in Gabel that the "United States [had] failed and
refused to act on the claims of the plaintiffs filed under 28 U.S.C. 5
2675 within the six months' period . . . and that [sluch inaction
[made] it appropriate [for] . . . corresponding declaratory relief
with respect to the class as a whole."'"
The failure of the United States to act presupposes that the United States has a duty to act on the claims of the plaintiffs within the
six month period. This, however, is not the case. The Federal Torts
Claim Act 9 under which these plaintiffs seek to recover against
the United States requires the claimant to submit his tort in writing
to the appropriate federal agency before litigation. Failure of the
agency to act on the claim constitutes a constructive denial for purposes of permitting suit. Since the United States is not obligated
under the statute to respond to the plaintiffs' claims within the six
months, its inaction could not provide a basis for the (b) (2) action in itself.'
There were, however, additional facts in Gabel which may have
prompted the district court to qualify the case as a (b) (2) class
action. During the discovery proceeding, the Gabel court granted a
requested stay to the defendants, United States and Air West. The
defendants informed the district court that they had arrived at a
percentage contribution of settlement. The district court granted
the stay conditioned on the defendants' diligent and good faith attempt to settle all claims arising from the crash. At the expiration
of the stay, defendants had settled few cases. The district court took
note of this failure to settle and resumed discovery proceedings on
the liability issue. These facts in conjunction with the United States'
" 350 F. Supp. at 630.
"The plaintiffs seek to recover against the defendant, United States, under
the Federal Torts Claims Act. An absolute condition precedent to the institution

of a Federal Torts Claims Act suit in federal district court is the administrative
submission by the claimant of his tort claim in writing to the appropriate federal

agency. A second condition precedent to the filing of suit, after the administrative
submission of the claim, is a denial of that claim by the federal agency to which
the claim was submitted. Denial may occur in one of three ways: (i)the claim
may be disapproved in writing by the agency to which it was presented and sent
by registered or certified mail to the claimant; (ii) the federal agency to which

the claim was submitted may make an offer to the claimant less than the amount
claimed; or (iii) inaction by the federal agency for a period of six months may
be deemed, at the option of the claimant, a constructive denial for the purpose

of permitting suit; 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1970).
40

Id.

1974]

CASE NOTES

failure to settle the plaintiffs' claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2675 were
apparently sufficient to satisfy the (b) (2) requirement.
The major problem with the district court's application of subdivision (b) (2) is that the subsection is not intended to apply to
situations in which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or
predominantly to money damages." Accordingly, the word "corresponding" in subdivision (b) (2) is used to limit application of
the subdivision to actions in which the declaratory relief has the effect of an injunction." Although declaratory relief will be involved
as an interim measure in Gabel, it will not be the final remedy
should the class prevail. In that instance final relief will be each
plaintiff's individual award of damages.
With respect to the applicability of subdivision (b) (1) (B),
the federal district court in Gabel concluded that
[a]djudications exonerating any one of the defendants would as a
practical matter certainly impair or impede the ability of the other
plaintiffs to recover against the defendant who might be exonerated. In fact, if the doctrine of res judicata were strictly applied in
such an instance, it would not only impede or impair that ability,
but deny it entirely. "8
This language is indeed a broad interpretation of the doctrine of
res judicata. The general rule is that a previous judgment has no
binding effect on anyone not a party to the previous action." Even
though the defendants, Air West and the United States, might succeed in defeating the claims of one plaintiff, the remaining plaintiffs,
not having had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of the
common defendant's liability, cannot be bound by the previous determination.
The district court in Gabel may have feared that some expanded
theory of collateratal estoppel might be applied to subject subsequent plaintiffs to a previous decision exonerating the common defendants. The courts have on occasion abandoned the mutuality
concept of collateral estoppel.' Furthermore, it has been said that
"FED. R. CIv. P. 23, Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102 (1966).
" Id.
F. Supp. at 630.
"See, e.g., Strong v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 52 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Tex.
1943).
" See, e.g., Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal.2d 807, 122 P.2d 892
(1942).
4350
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the trend in the federal courts is away from the rigid requirements
of mutuality of estoppel."6
While the trend may favor the abandonment of mutuality, it has
not extended to the application of prior judgments to subsequent litigants not parties to the previous litigation. In fact, such an application would violate due process. 7 The doctrine of collateral estoppel
permits application of a prior judgment to preclude relitigation of
an issue previously determined on its merits, but the prior judgment
can only be applied against a party to the previous action."8
With respect to the applicability of subdivision (b) (1) (A) the
district court in Gabel stated that
prosecutions of separate actions by the individual plaintiffs would
create a risk of . . . inconsistent or varying adjudications on the
question of liability, in which event there would be established incompatible standards of conduct for the defendants. "'
To permit maintenance of a class action under subdivision (b)
(1) (A), the court must determine that allowing members to proceed on their own will expose the common defendant to a serious
risk of being put into a conflicted position."0 It has been suggested
that this requirement encompasses more than a risk that separate
judgments would oblige the opposing party to pay damages to some
class members but not to others or to pay them different amounts. 1
Generally the phrase "incompatible standards of conduct" refers
to the situation in which different results in separate actions would
impair the opposing party's ability to pursue a uniform continuing
course of conduct.52
Despite these constructions of rule 23 (b)
(1 ) (A), the district court's literal interpretation of this subdivision
in Gabel has a great deal of merit. The scope of an action maintainable under subdivision (b) (1) (A) is unclear. 3 In light of the
4' Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402
U.S. at 326 (1971).
47
Id. at 329.
40 Humphreys v. Tann, 487 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1973).
4 350 F. Supp. at 630.
" Kaplan, supra note 5, at 388.
117A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL,
1773, at 9 (1971).
52
1d. at 9-10.
" Hernandez v. Motor Vessel Skyward, 61 F.R.D. 558, 561 n.8 (S.D. Fla.
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expanding concept of collateral estoppel and the judicial trend toward the abandonment of the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel, the
spirit of rule 23 (b) (1) (A) is fulfilled in that the class action will
"provide a ready and fair means of achieving unitary adjudication."5 By allowing each plaintiff a separate trial against the common defendants,
it is conceivable that the defendants would be taken to task by one
passenger after another until a judgment against the defendants
was obtained. At that point, future plaintiffs could call the doctrine
of collateral estoppel into play to bind the defendants on the issue
of (liability) ...'
This conclusion is suggested by recent decisions of the United
States Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit which have to a great extent repudiated the doctrine of mutuality heretofore inherent in the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel."
The courts have increasingly abandoned the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel in order to conserve time and thereby relieve the
strain of congested dockets. In commenting on the demise of the
doctrine of mutuality, the United States Supreme Court said that
[tihe courts have often discarded the rule while commenting on
crowded dockets and long delays preceding trial. Authorities differ
on whether the public interest in efficient judicial administration is
a sufficient ground in and of itself for abandoning mutuality, but
it is clear that more than crowded dockets is involved. The broader
question is whether it is any longer tenable to afford a litigant more
than one full and fair opportunity for judicial resolution of the
same issue."
The offensive use of collateral estoppel,"8 however, induces sep5 Id.
5Id.

at 561.

"See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402
U.S. 313 (1971); Rachal v. Hill, 435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970).
11 Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402
U.S. 313, 327 (1971).
58 Collateral estoppel is asserted offensively when a prior judgment
against the defendants is held to be conclusive as to issues also
raised in a later suit between a similarly situated plaintiff and the
same defendant.
Comment, Mass Accident Class Actions, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1615, 1628 n.89
(1972).
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aration of actions,"' and therefore would appear to consume more
court time and consequently burden more court dockets when used
in place of the class action. One court in one trial could establish
the issue of a common defendant's liability. The liability issue thus
determined would be res judicata as to all members of the class,
and the home forum selected by each plaintiff would only determine the relatively simple and less time consuming damages issue.
Almost invariably when the requirements of subdivision (b) (1)
and (b) (2) are met, the requirements of the (b) (3) are met
also." The district court in Gabel may not have considered the (b)
(3) class action because of the accepted view that where the requirements of (b) (1), (b) (2), and (b) (3) are all met by the
facts of the case, the case should be tried as a (b) (1) or (b) (2)
class suit."1 Therefore, once the Gabel court determined that the
class action was maintainable under (b) (1) and (b) (2), it was
unnecessary to discuss the appropriateness of the (b) (3) provision. " It also seems quite likely that the district court in Gabel
favored the (b) (1) or (b) (2) class suit because of the opt out
procedural safeguard built into the (b) (3) class action. The opt
out provision would be very damaging to the mass accident class
suit since the clever plaintiff would prefer to excuse himself from
the class, knowing that should the class prevail, he might still have
the opportunity to apply the decision to his benefit in a later individual suit through the offensive use of collateral estoppel."1
Since subdivision (b) (1) (A) compels a single trial on the liability issue, the class members could not remove themselves from
the class, thereby destroying the benefits of the class suit. Savings
to the courts in time and reduced docket congestion however are
not the only benefits to be derived from the class action. Savings
5

1Id. at 1628.
It seems apparent that virtually every class action that meets the re-

60

quirements of 23(b)(1) or 23(b)(2) will also meet the less severe
requirements of 23(b)(3). However where the stricter requirements
of 23(b)(1) or 23(b)(2) are squarely presented by the plaintiffs'
claims, rule 23(b)(3) is not applicable.
Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 259 F. Supp. 125, 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
61 Id.
62
Hernandez v. Motor Vessel Skyward, 61 F.R.D. 558, 561 n.8 (S.D. Fla.
1974).
3 It has been urged that a plaintiff who chose to withdraw from a class action
should not be allowed to assert offensively a judgment for the class. C. WRIGHT,

HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, § 72, at 314 (1970).
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are also passed along to the plaintiffs and defendants in the form
of reduced litigations costs.
Perhaps the greatest single saving to the plaintiffs and the defendants is reduced attorney's fees. Under the alternatives to the
class action," the court cannot set the attorney's fee. In those situations the attorney is ordinarily working on a contigent fee and the
court cannot disturb the attorney-client contract. On the other hand,
representation of the class by counsel is not a result of a private
contract but results from an opportunity to represent the class by
judicial determination.' By declaring the suit a class action and by
appointing the attorney who best represents the interest of the class,
the court receives the right to determine what the attorney's "fair
and reasonable" fee will be, thereby relieving the plaintiffs of the
higher cumulative sum of contingent fees to individual attorneys."'
Since the defendant will not be compelled to litigate the issue of his
liability again and again, his litigation costs should also be diminished.
It appears that class suits conducted under subdivisions (b) (1)
(A), (b) (1) (B), and (b) (2) of rule 23 are the most efficient
for mass accident litigation because they compel a single trial on
the liability issue. The applicability of subdivisions (b) (1) (B)
"See note 17 supra.

'FED. R. Cv. P. 23(a)(4).
Only reasonable charges for fees and expenses should be authorized

upon approval by the court ...
If the litigation is concluded by determination on the merits,
the court should expressly provide in the judgment, or in one of
the earlier class management orders, for control by the court of the

charges for attorneys' fees and expenses ...
Once adequate compensation sufficient to provide the motive for
representation of classes is provided, no further incentive is required.
In this connection, while any fee allowed in the case of a settlement
or recovery through litigation may constitute a percentage of the

total amount recovered, the reasonableness of the fee arrived at
should not rest primarily on the selection of a percentage of the
total recovery. Although the results obtained in representing the

class should be given consideration as provided in the Code of Professional Responsibility, there should also be an emphasis upon the
time and labor required and the effect of the allowance on the public
interest and the reputation of the courts. In no event should repre-

sentation of a judicially determined class be allowed on the same
basis as in a contingent fee contract between competent contracting
counsel and client.
MANUAL

FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, Control of Attorney Fees and Expenses in

Class Actions, Pt. I,

§

1.47, at 49-50 (1973).
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and (b) (2) to future mass accident situations, however, is dubious. Subdivision (b) (1) (B) would require an extremely broad
interpretation of res judicataY' Subdivision (b) (2) is limited to
actions which seek injunctive or corresponding declaratory relief
as a final remedy and is therefore not applicable to mass accident
litigation. Subdivision (b) (3) is a possible candidate for future
use in mass accident litigation. Here, however, the possibility of
wholesale defection of class members through the opt out provision
is that method's drawback. If large numbers of the class elect to
remove themselves, the class action will prove ineffectual and the
court will have wasted, rather than conserved, its valuable time.
The (b) (1) (A) class suit is the most desirable for future mass
accident litigation. The major problem facing such an application
of subdivision (b) (1) (A) is that the decided weight of authority has construed this subdivision to be inappropriate for mass accident litigation." Nevertheless, it appears that the spirit of rule 23
is fulfilled by just such an application.
Charles Bennett Lord

FIFTH AMENDMENT TAKING-INVERSE CONDEMNATION
-Before a Taking Under the Inverse Condemnation Theory Will
Be Found, Permanence Must Be Established Both in the Federal
Activity Alleged to Have Caused the Damage and in the Resulting
Burden Placed on Private Property. Wilfong v. United States, 480
F.2d 1326 (Ct. C1. 1973).
Plaintiff, a chicken farm owner, instituted an action in the Court
of Claims against the United States to recover damages, claiming
that his property rights in the airspace superadjacent to his farm
had been inversely condemned. He asserted that this "taking" was
accomplished when frequent, violent, and noisy overflights of military aircraft directly over his property disrupted and impaired his
commercial egg and poultry business; the complaint alleged that
the overflights damaged plaintiff's henhouses and injured his flock,
7See

notes 45-48 supra and accompanying text.

e8See notes 50-52 supra and accompanying text.
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thereby diminishing the value of his land. Held, complaint dismissed for lack of jurisdiction: To constitute a fifth amendment
taking, permanence must be established both in the federal activity complained of and in the resulting effect on private property.
Wilfong v. United States, 480 F. 2d 1326 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
Jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to hear an inverse condemnation action presented a problem for plaintiff in Wilfong. The statute
governing the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims provides that the
court only has jurisdiction to hear and determine "any claim
against the United States founded either upon the Constitution...
or upon any express or implied contract with the United States...
not sounding in tort."' The Court of Claims has jurisdiction over a
claim for relief based on inverse condemnation, which is not considered a tort but a fifth amendment taking. Since the court
found in Wilfong that plaintiff's claim sounded in tort, it had no
choice but to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.! Wilfong therefore gives new significance to the prerequisite of permanence in inverse condemnation theory, a prerequisite that heretofore had not been a problem for property owners seeking relief from
aviation overflights that lessened the value of their property, and introduces the concept of permanence in aviation "taking" cases as a
jurisdictional mechanism to deny the property owner his claim for
relief.
The power of eminent domain is of ancient origin. One theory
developed to justify the power is that possession and enjoyment of
all property are derived from a grant of the sovereign and thus subject to an implied right of reclamation by the sovereign at a later
time.' The power of eminent domain, broadly defined as the power
to take private property for public use," has been said to be essential
to the very existence of government. There are two limitations on
this power. First, the fifth amendment dictates that private prop128 U.S.C. § 1491 (1970).

2The fact that the Court of Claims did not deny the existence of consequential
damages is interpreted to mean that the plaintiff may proceed under a theory of
trespass or nuisance in a federal district court under the Federal Tort Claims
Act. 28 U.S.C. S 1346(b) (1970).
3

Templer, A Landowner's View of Federal Eminent Domain in Kansas, 18

U. KAN. L. REV. 907 (1970).
4BLACK'S LAw DIc'rIoNAY 616 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
5 Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875).
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erty cannot be appropriated for public use unless compensation is
paid by a governmental entity." The second limitation on the power
of the sovereign is that the taking must be for a public use."
A taking of private property may be accomplished either by condemnation or by inverse condemnation. Conventional condemnation is exercised by the appropriate condemning authority with the
extent and purpose of the acquisition depending on numerous legislative and administrative factors. The landowner's remedies for
such a taking are extremely limited since he may not challenge a
congressional determination that the taking is necessary. The
acquiring agency has the power to determine when the proceeding
will be instituted and the quality and quantity of the estate to be
taken. Upon commencement of proceedings in a court of law the
issue of compensation is normally the only real question that the
landowner may raise. There is in fact little that he can do to impede
the process of formal eminent domain proceedings.
Inverse condemnation, on the other hand, describes a de facto
taking of property by governmental activity such as the overflight of
aircraft. The benefits of formal eminent domain proceedings are
denied the property owner in this situation since the use of the
property has already been appropriated or destroyed.
Since the arrival of the airplane as a convenient mode of travel,
there has been continuing controversy over who is entitled to primary use of airspace-the aircraft or the subadjacent property owner.! An invasion of the superadjacent airspace by dangerous, lowflying aircraft often affects the use of the surface itself. When private property has been taken in this manner by a governmental
authority, the landowner, in the exercise of his constitutional rights,
may maintain an inverse condemnation action to obtain just compensation for the property taken.
' The fifth amendment states " . . . nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation," U.S. CONST., amend. V.
Note, Techniques for Preserving Open Spaces, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1622, 1631
(1962).
' At least five theories have been advanced to correlate the landowner's right
to his corresponding airspace: (i) a landowner owned all of the airspace from
the heavens to the depths of the earth; (ii) a landowner owned all of the airspace,
but was subject to a public easement for flight; (iii) a landowner owned that
amount of airspace fixed by statute; (iv) a landowner owned airspace to the extent that he could effectively possess it; and (v) a landowner owned all the airspace that he could actually occupy. Russell, Recent Developments in Inverse Condemnation of Airspace, 39 J. AIR L. & CoM. 81 (1973).
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An essential issue in any inverse condemnation suit is whether
there has been a "taking" in the constitutional sense. The common
law actions available to the landowner for invasion of his land by
intruding aircraft operations were largely restricted to trespass9 and
nuisance." In 1946 the United States Supreme Court in Causby v.
United States" charted a new theory of recovery based on the fifth
amendment by introducing the concept of inverse condemnation to
the law of airspace. Departing from the established common law
theories, the Court combined elements of trespass with those of
nuisance. In Causby the Court distinguished the legalized nuisance
cases by finding an actual invasion of the plaintiff's property."2
In Causby, the plaintiff lived near the end of a runway of an Air
Force base, and bombers repeatedly swept over his land at altitudes
of less than one hundred feet. Plaintiff's chicken farm operation
was severely damaged by these overflights. The Court declared that
even though the airspace is a public highway, 8 low and frequent
flights by government aircraft that interfere with the enjoyment and
use of property are takings, notwithstanding the absence of formal
condemnation proceedings.' Thus, the Court determined that when
an aircraft interferes with the normal use and enjoyment of the
owner's land, the operation is a taking for which the land owner is
entitled to just compensation." Inverse condemnation has been
" For a trespass theory to be successful, there must be an actual unprivileged
and unpermitted physical invasion of the property of the party bringing the suit.
See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 63-79 (4th ed. 1971).

0 A nuisance may arise without a physical invasion if the activity unreasonably
interferes with the use and enjoyment of the property. See W. DEFUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUrrY 59-74 (2d ed. 1956).
" 328 U.S. 256 (1946).

" Some legalized nuisance cases are: Richards v. Washington Terminal Co.,
233 U.S. 546 (1913); Baltimore & P.R.R. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U.S. 317
(1883); Chicago G.W. Ry. v. First Methodist Episcopal Church, 102 F. 85 (8th
Cir. 1900).
"1"The air is a public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true,

every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless trespass suits.
Common sense revolts at the idea." 328 U.S. at 261.
id. at 266.
5 The superadjacent airspace at this low altitude is so close to the
land that continuous invasions of it affect the use of the surface of
the land itself. We think that the landowner, as an incident to his

'4

ownership, has a claim to it and that invasions of it are in the same
category as invasions of the surface.
Id. at 265 (emphasis added). See also Eubank, The Doctrine of the Airspace
Zone of Effective Possession, 12 BOSTON U.L. REv. 414 (1932).

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

widely used as a theory of recovery since its introduction in
Causby."
Ordinarily, the term "taking" connotes something more than destruction, for one cannot appropriate what one destroys. The courts,
however, have chosen to liberalize construction of the term so that
the deprivation of the former owner rather than the accretion of a
right to the soverign constitutes a taking. Governmental action short
of actual occupancy or possession of title has been held to amount
to a taking if the effect is to deprive the owner of all or most of his
interest in the subject matter." Three crucial factors must be present to sustain a claim for relief for a taking. A plaintiff must sustain the burden of proof that there has been (i) a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land;" (ii)
a direct physical overflight;" and (iii) permanence in both the federal activity and in the consequences imposed upon the private
property."
The first factor that is a prerequisite to recovery is couched in
terms of substantial interference with the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of his land. It has been held that under the Causby rationale,
a plaintiff must show that overflights interfere with the existing use
of the land or that they occur in airspace which might be occupied
by the landowner. 2 It is sufficient to show a taking if the overflights
are frequent and low enough to interfere with a potential use of the
land.' If substantial interference is explained in terms of duration
in time rather than in terms of a single destructive occurrence, the
concept of taking under the fifth amendment is more easily comprehended. The principle enunciated in Wilfong is that the word
"permanence" encompasses a servitude of continuous duration, not
just a single occurrence.
The second factor "taking" involves the question of what consti1"Harvey,

Landowner's Rights in the Air Age: The Airport Dilemma, 56

MICH. L. REV. 1313 (1958).

'See Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1913); United
States v. Welch, 217 U.S. 333 (1909).

"See note 11 supra.
"'Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962).
"See note 11 supra.
21Mock v. United States, 164 Ct. Cl. 473 (1964).

"'Nestle v. City of Santa Monica, 6 Cal. 3d 920, 496 P.2d 480, 101 Cal. Rptr.
568 (1972).
23 Id.
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tutes a taking of airspace. In Batten v. United States" the Tenth

Circuit Court of Appeals defined a taking as "governmental action
short of occupancy.. . if its effects are so complete as to deprive
the owner of all or most of his interest in the subject matter. ' The
court in Batten denied recovery because there was no direct physical trespass. Thus, recovery is precluded, absent a physical invasion
of airspace,"0 and many courts impose an overflight requirement.'
In addition, some courts have applied a "500-foot rule" of overflight, which requires that the taking involve not only a physical

trespass of the airspace, but also that the overflight be less than 500
feet above the surface."
24 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962). The plaintiffs did not live in a direct overflight path of the jet aircraft, but based their damages on the noise, vibration and
smoke emissions emitted by the aircraft. The plaintiffs argued that since Causby
allowed recovery for vertical sound and shock waves, recovery for horizontal
waves should also be allowed. See also Note, Government Not Required to Compensate Homeowners When Damage from Airplane Operations Not Due to Direct
Overflights, 63 COLO. L. REv. 755 (1963).
2306
F.2d at 585.
21The majority opinion in Batten has engendered criticism in several recent
cases. See Nestle v. City of Santa Monica, 5 Cal. 3d 920, 496 P.2d 480, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 568 (1972); Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 244 Ore. 69, 415 P.2d 750
(1966); Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 391 P.2d 540 (1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 939 (1965). For a complete history of cases, see Lesser, The
Aircraft Noise Problem: Federal Power But Local Liability, 3 URBAN LAw. 175
(1971); Comment, The Airport Cases: Condemnation by Nuisance and Beyond,
7 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 271 (1971). These state courts have generally tended
to follow the rationale of the dissenting opinion in Batten by Chief Judge Murrah.
The judge stated:
As I reason, the constitutional test in each case is first, whether the
asserted interest is one which the law will protect; if so, whether
the interference is sufficiently direct, sufficiently peculiar, and of
sufficient magnitude to cause us to conclude that fairness and justness, as between the State and the citizen, requires the burden imposed to be borne by the public and not by the individual alone.
306 F.2d at 587. Thus the decisions following the Batten dissent hold that there
is no requirement of an overflight nor of direct physical invasion of airspace over
the complainant's land to maintain an action for a "taking" of land. Several authorities have also urged that the Batten minority is the better reasoned analysis.
See Note, Nuisance Actions Against Municipal Airports, 48 WASH. L. REV. 904
(1973). See Comment, Inverse Condemnation in Washington-Is the Lid Off
Pandora'sBox?, 39 WASH. L. REv. 920 (1965).
"See, e.g., Creel v. Atlanta, 399 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1968); East Haven v.
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 16 (D. Conn. 1971); Schubert v. United
States, 246 F. Supp. 170 (S.D. Tex 1965). The court in Wilfong did not consider
the overflight requirement as it was established that the military aircraft flew
directly over the plaintiff's property.
28Schubert v. United States, 246 F. Supp. 170 (S.D. Tex. 1965). See also
49 U.S.C. S 1301(24) (1970). The court in Wilfong did not consider this to be
a barrier to recovery even though the minimum flight level was 500 feet. The

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

The third factor in establishing a "taking" under the fifth
amendment is permanence. Until the Wilfong decision the fifth
amendment "taking" decisions involved only two types of factual
situations involving aircraft: (i) those in which take-off and landing procedures intruded upon the landowner's superadjacent airspace2 and (ii) those in which supersonic aircraft caused damage

to the surface.3" The factual situation in Wilfong is unique because
it presents a case of first impression involving damages caused by
level overflights originating from a distant source. 1 The take-off and
landing cases involved a glide angle pattern of ascent and descent
of aircraft while departing from or arriving at an adjacent permanent airport with the result that the aircraft inevitably crossed the
land beyond the runway at low altitudes. Since the military flights
in Wilfong did not involve descending and ascending aircraft nor
sonic boom damage, the Court of Claims had to consider specifically the factor of permanence.
The prerequisite of permanence in an inverse condemnation suit
is not a new concept. In Wilfong the Court of Claims referred to a
series of cases dealing with the taking of riparian property rights
by permanent or periodic flooding caused by federal dam projects.
In one line of riparian cases plaintiffs' property became permanently submerged by frequent overflows. The Supreme Court declared that there was no difference in kind, but only degree, between a permanent condition of continual overflow by backwater
and a permanent liability for intermittent but inevitably recurring
overflows." In principle the right to compensation arises in both situations, but if there is any use of the land remaining to the owner,
the taking may be treated "as a partial instead of a total divesting
minimum flight level was raised to 1500 feet and finally to 2000 feet. 480 F.2d
at 1328.
2 See note 16 supra.
3

Kirk v. United States, 451 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1971).

"1480 F.2d at 1326. The Air Force reconnaissance aircraft in question were
stationed in South Carolina many miles away from the plaintiff's farm in North
Carolina. The pilots flew from target to target discharging their basic missions of
training experienced pilots to take reconnaissance photographs of selected ground
targets from low levels at high speeds.
" United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950); Jacobs v.
United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933); United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917);
United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903).
-United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328 (1917).
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of his property in the land."' In a second line of decisions recovery
was precluded by plaintiffs' failure to prove inevitability of recurrence.' In one situation the plaintiff failed to prove that floods
which occurred in the spring of one year would "inevitably recur." '
In three successive decisions, the Court of Claims found that despite the flooding of the plaintiff's power plant on three separate
occasions within a seventeen year period, no permanent burden had
been placed on the plaintiff's property.' Thus, to establish taking,
plaintiff had to show the effect of the flooding to be permanent
rather than a randomly recurring event.
The court in Wilfong drew support for its ruling from another
decision"8 relating to aerial invasions of private property caused by
federal action. There, it was found that if the plaintiff's property is
subjected to invasions caused by governmental action whenever
the government chooses to act, then the subordination of the property to that use imposes a servitude. This philosophy was borrowed
from Causby in which the United States Supreme Court placed
great emphasis on the frequency of the overflights, despite the temporary nature of each overflight."9
The decision in Wilfong must also be analyzed by comparison
with a series of lease cases."0 During World War II the federal govId.
'National By-Products, Inc. v. United States, 405 F.2d 1256 (Ct. Cl. 1969);
North Counties Hydro-Electric Co. v. United States, 170 Ct. Cl. 241 (1965).
"' National By-Products, Inc. v. United States, 405 F.2d 1256, 1274 (Ct. CI.
1969).
"' North Counties Hydro-Electric Co. v. United States, 170 Ct. Cl. 241, 247
(1965). See also North Counties Hydro-Electric Co. v. United States, 151 F.
Supp. 322 (Ct. CI. 1957); North Counties Hydro-Electric Co. v. United States,
70 F. Supp. 900 (Ct. Cl. 1947).
11Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922).
The government had constructed a gun battery and intermittently fired such batteries over the plaintiff's property for a period of years.
" On remand in Causby, the lower court found a compensable taking for a
four and a half year period. Causby v. United States, 109 Ct. Cl. 768 (1948).
The lower court holding indicates that a fifth amendment taking encompasses
not only permanent servitudes, but also temporary occupancy. See also United
States v. Improved Premises, 80 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); United States v.
412.715 Acres of Land, 53 F. Supp. 143 (N.D. Cal. 1943); Anderson v. Port of
Seattle, 49 Wash. 2d 528, 304 P.2d 705 (1956).
4
United States v. General Motors, 323 U.S. 373 (1945); Gershon Bros. v.
United States, 248 F. 849 (5th Cir. 1922); United States v. Improved Premises, 54
F. Supp. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1944); United States v. Entire Fifth Floor, 54 F. Supp.
258 (S.D.N.Y. 1944); Leonard v. Autocar Sales & Serv. Co., 392 I11.
182, 64
N.E.2d 477 (1946), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 604 (1946).
34
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ernment occupied numerous leased buildings through the exercise
of its eminent domain power. In United States v. General Motors"
the United States Government condemned and possessed property
for a period of one year in a lease of twenty years. There was no
question that a taking had occurred and just compensation was
due. One difference between General Motors and Wilfong is the
duration of interference with the property use. In General Motors
the taking was for a one year period while in Wilfong the government's action was considered tortious in nature because of the brief
duration of the taking."' It is clear that the decision in Wilfong
places a premium on duration of occupancy.
Another distinction between Causby and Wilfong is the element
of substantial interference. In Causby the character of the invasion,
not the monetary value of damage resulting from it, as long as the
damage was substantial, determined the issue of whether there was
a taking." The character of the invasion-low-flying aircraft-was
similar in both fact situations. But the damage to the use of the
property differed in that the plaintiff in Wilfong had a one-time
personal property loss of chickens, whereas the plaintiff in Causby
had a continuing loss of the use of the real property for a four and
one-half year period. The court in Wilfong was arguably correct in
its denial of relief under the fifth amendment for an insignificant
invasion. The judiciary must draw the line of recovery at some
point for a fifth amendment taking as opposed to a tort action.
The fifth amendment does not comprehend recovery on a cause of
action sounding in tort. Congress has provided other avenues of
recovery, such as the Federal Tort Claims Act" to deal with such
situations as occurred in Wilfong.
The element of permanence has been implicitly if not expressly
found in all aviation taking cases. ' The decision in Wilfong makes
inroads into the denial of a plaintiff's claim for recovery when the
4"323 U.S. 373 (1945).

"A

factual finding of the period of interference was narrowed to a three

month period of overflight. 480 F.2d at 1331.
4328 U.S. at 266.
-28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970).
" Bacon v. United States, 295 F.2d 936 (Ct. Cl. 1961); Dick v. United States,

144 Ct. Cl. 424 (1959); Adaman Mut. Water Co. v. United States, 181 F. Supp.

658 (Ct. Cl. 1958); Highland Park, Inc. v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 597 (Ct.
CI. 1956).
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property is distant from any airport. The factor of permanence is
necessarily present when the claimant resides near an airport, in
that departing and arriving aircraft continuously cross claimant's
property as long as the runway is in use. A plaintiff such as the
plaintiff in Wilfong will clearly have difficulty proving permanence
when the interfering aircraft do not habitually fly near the landowner's property. Even if the aircraft interferes with the landowner's airspace, the decision in Wilfong restricts the inverse condemnation theory by requiring permanency both in the federal activity
complained of and in the consequences imposed on the private
property.
In emphasizing the prerequisite of permanence for a finding of
"taking," Wilfong virtually precludes any chance of recovery upon
the inverse condemnation theory asserted by a damaged plaintiff
distant from an aviation field. This decision and its emphasis on
permanence, however, overlooks the underlying policy reasons for
recognizing an action for inverse condemnation to compensate the
landowner for the substantial damage and interference in use of
the property. The court did not rule out alternative theories of recovery via private tort actions based on traditional theories of nuisance and trespass but intimated that the fifth amendment concept of "taking" was not meant to be easily invoked but, rather,
applied only in situations when substantial interference with the use
of the property was incurred. The factor of permanence demands
that the Causby rationale be applied only when the plaintiff sustains a heavy burden of proof by showing permanence in both the
federal activity and upon the consequences imposed upon the private property.
Martin C. Ruegsegger

FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION-AIATION NOISE CONTROL-The
Federal Aviation Administration, Monitored by the Environmental
Protection Agency, Has Full Control Over Aviation Noise, Preempting State and Local Control, Including a Municipal Ordinance
Which Imposed a Curfew on Certain Jet Take-offs During Certain
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Night-time Hours. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc.,
411 U.S. 624 (1973).
The city of Burbank, California, adopted an ordinance making
"pure jet" aircraft take-offs from the Hollywood-Burbank Airport
between 11:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. unlawful and prohibiting the
operator of that airport from allowing such take-offs (except in
certain emergency cases) during the prohibited hours.1 The operator
of the airport, Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc.,' brought suit to enjoin the enforcement of the ordinance. The injunction was granted
by the United States District Court for the Central District of California! and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.'
The United States Supreme Court noted jurisdiction,' then decided
the case without reaching the interstate commerce or conflict of laws
questions considered by the lower courts.6 Held, affirmed: The Federal Aviation Administration, monitored by the Environmental
Protection Agency, has complete authority and responsibility for
aviation noise control under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,
preempting state and local governmental control of aviation noise.
City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624
(1973).
The relationship of federal and state authority in the regulation
' BURBANK, CAL. MUNICIPAL CODE

§ 20-32.1 (1970), quoted in 318 F. Supp.

at 916-17, provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person at the controls of a pure

jet aircraft to take off from the Hollywood-Burbank Airport
between 11:00 P.M. of one day and 7:00 A.M. the next day.
(b) It shall be unlawful for the operator of the Hollywood-Burbank
Airport to allow a pure jet aircraft to take off from said airport between 11:00 P.M. of one day and 7:00 A.M. the next
day.

(c) This section shall not apply to flights of an emergency nature
if the City's Police Department is contacted and the approval
of the Watch Commander on duty is obtained before take-off.
'The airport operator was joined by several carriers as co-plaintiffs and the
FAA as amicus curiae.

'Lockheed

Air Terminal, Inc. v. City of Burbank, 318 F. Supp. 914 (C.D.

Cal. 1970).

"Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. v. City of Burbank, 457 F.2d 667 (9th Cir.
1972). The Court of Appeals decided the case on the issues of pre-emption and
conflict of state and federal authority, 457 F.2d at 675, whereas the District Court
had relied on pre-emption and a finding that the ordinance constituted an undue
burden on interstate commerce. 318 F. Supp. at 930.
1409
U.S. 840 (1972).
6411 U.S. 624 (1973). See note 4 supra.
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of commerce has been characterized by controversy over which
authority shall prevail: the federal government's commerce power
or the states' police power. Pre-emption of state regulation is generally defined as manifest congressional intent to control an activity
to the exclusion of state regulation. The federal commerce power
has preempted the states' police power in the fields of railway safety
equipment,' interstate shipment of food products,' and registration
of aliens.' Concurrent regulation, however, has been permitted in
areas involving the interstate shipment of fresh fruits,'" the control of striking workers," and the regulation of equipment and
operating standards for ships on navigable waters." Throughout all
these decisions, the courts have struggled to devise a standard for
determining when federal pre-emption has occurred. This determination is not difficult when there is an expressed congressional intent that the field be regulated exclusively by the federal government,
but this is seldom the case, and the courts must make a determination of the implied intent of Congress. In Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator," the Supreme Court articulated a test that was a synthesis of
the standards utilized in previous cases. In Rice, a case concerning
the federal and state regulation of grain elevators, the Court recognized the gravity of a finding of pre-emption of the state police
power and required a showing of clear and manifest intent by
Congress that the federal regulation should preempt the state authority before the state authority could be set aside. Recognizing
that the intention of Congress to preempt may not be apparent on
the face of the statute, the Court established a three-pronged test to
determine the intention of Congress if none were directly evident.
Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605 (1926).
' Cloverleaf Butter v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942).
'Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
"Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963) (California
statute specifying the minimum oil content of fresh avocados entering the state
held valid).
"1Allen Bradley Local 1111, United Electrical Workers v. Wisconsin Empl.
Rel. Bd., 315 U.S. 740 (1942) (state statute regulating public demonstrations
held not repugnant to National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.

(1970)).
" Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) (city antipollution ordinance held applicable to vessels operating on navigable waterways
subject to federal license requirements).
"3331 U.S. 218 (1947).
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The Court recognized three independent ways that congressional
intent to preempt could be ascertained:
(i) if the scheme of federal regulation is so pervasive as to
make reasonable the inference that Congress left no
room for the states to supplement it, or,
(ii) if the act of Congress may touch a field in which the
federal interest is so dominant that the federal system
will be assumed to preclude the enforcement of state
laws on the same subject, or,
(iii) if the state law may produce a result inconsistent with
the federal statute, the federal measure must prevail.'
Federal pre-emption in the field of noise control and abatement
has been much discussed in recent years as air carriers have employed increasing numbers of jet aircraft and the noise problems
associated with the mushrooming air transport industry have affected more and more lives across the nation. The two cases prior to
Burbank most directly addressing the problem of airport noise
abatement were Allegheny Airlines v. Village of Cedarhurst" and
American Airlines v. Town of Hempstead." Both cases involved
attempts by suburban cities neighboring Kennedy Airport to control the noise created by planes taking off from the airport. The
Cedarhurst ordinance prohibited flights over the Village at altitudes
less than 1000 feet. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that this was an encroachment on the federallypreempted domain of air traffic control since the ordinance conflicted with federal regulations." The Town of Hempstead enacted
an ordinance prohibiting the production of noises in certain noise
spectra inside the town limits. Planes departing Kennedy were in
violation of the ordinance on normal take off. The federal district
court held that this ordinance was even broader than the ordinance
" Id. at 230. These three tests had been formulated in other cases in part:
(i) federal regulatory scheme is so pervasive as to leave no room for the states
to complement it, Pennsylvania R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566
(1919); Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942); (ii) dominant
federal interest, Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941); Napier v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605 (1926); and (iii) state and federal regulation
inconsistent; Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945). Rice marked the first presentation of these factors as a consolidated test.
"238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956).
11272 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).

"238 F.2d at 814.
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in Cedarhurstbecause it theoretically could affect flying at altitudes
greater than 1000 feet, and therefore the ordinance, like that in
Cedarhurst,conflicted with the federal regulations and was thereby
preempted.18 Both of these cases were decided with reference to the
federal air traffic control regulations and not the noise abatement
statutes which were at issue in Burbank. Thus, Burbank was the
first case to reach the Supreme Court on the issue of pre-emption
of aviation noise abatement.
The federal statute" at issue in Burbank is part of the overall
statutory scheme enacted by Congress to regulate aviation. The
genesis of the modem scheme was the Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938,0 enacted to consolidate and streamline the federal functions
in the field of aviation." The regulatory functions of the federal
government were marshalled under the newly created Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA) for a coordinated and effective federal
effort. The 1938 Act contained a new section, Title VI, concerning safety of flight." There was no express manifestation of congressional intent to preempt the field of aviation safety regulation, but
subsequent decisions have established that the federal government
has in fact preempted the states' authority in the field of aviation
safety. The federal authority has been held to be plenary in the
requirement of airworthiness certificates for aircraft,' and airmen'
as well as in age limitations for airmen.' In these situations the
courts have recognized the intent of Congress to preempt aviation
safety regulation. Although the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 was
superseded by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958," the 1958 act
retained the safety provisions of Title VF7 and the noise abatement
provision at issue in Burbank was inserted in Title VI in 1968.
"8272 F. Supp. 227.
949 U.S.C. § 1431 (1972).
"Act of June 23, 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 706.

REP. No. 2254, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. 1 (1938).
' Although the pressing problems of the aviation industry were primarily
economic ones, the 1938 Act created a far-sighted overall regulatory scheme for
21H.R.

the field of aviation.

'Rosenhan

v. United States, 131 F.2d 932 (10th Cir. 1942).

States v. Drumm, 55 F. Supp. 151 (D. Nev. 1944).
' ALPA v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1960).
'United
2Act

of August 23, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731.

2749 U.S.C.
"849 U.S.C.

5
5

1421 et seq. (1970).
1431 (1972).
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While the inclusion of the noise abatement provision in Title VI
would seem to indicate a congressional intent that the noise abatement provisions be preemptive, state court decisions have been to
the contrary.
For example, operations at a New Jersey airport were enjoined
for certain periods in Town of Hanover v. Town of Morristown"
where a New Jersey state court held that the legal and equitable
rights of citizens could be protected without offense to federal regulation of aviation noise. Hanover was followed in Parachutes,Inc.
v. Township of Lakewood" where plaintiff was unsuccessful in his
attempt to enjoin enforcement of an ordinance that effectively prohibited his operation of a plane utilized for dropping parachutists.
The court held that the federal government had not preempted regulation of flights during which the engine was repeatedly stopped
and restarted over the township as each parachutist was dropped.
A California state court has held3 that state regulations which affect
certain aspects of flight operations are not precluded because of an
extensive pattern of federal regulation in the field of aviation and
that regulation of a local matter such as noise control would be
invalid only if clearly in conflict with federal regulations. In Williams v. Superior Court," the Supreme Court of Arizona held that
the mere fact that the remedies available under state law might
infringe upon Federal preeminence was not a valid reason to deny
state courts the power to hear a case involving regulation of flight
and noise abatement.
Although there was no express congressional intent in the passage of the Federal Aviation Act in 1958 or in the 1968 amendment" to preempt the field of aviation noise control, the legislative
history of the 1968 amendment shows consideration of the possible
clash of state and local regulation. The Senate committee report"'
recognized the possible conflict between state and local government.
While disclaiming any intention to affect the existing apportionment of regulatory powers between the state and federal govern108 N.J. Super. 461, 261 A.2d 692 (1969).
so121 N.J. Super. 48, 296 A.2d 72 (1972).
81 Loma

Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc., 39 Cal. Rptr. 708, 394

P.2d 548 (Cal. 1964).
1 108 Ariz. 154, 494 P.2d 26 (1972).

"3Act of July 21, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-411, 82 Stat. 395.
IS. REP. No. 1353, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
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ments,' the committee accepted the Secretary of Transportation's
assessment of the existing apportionment. In a letter to the committee,' the Secretary, citing Hempstead, stated that the federal
government had preempted the field of aviation noise regulation.
The committee did not question this assessment, but simply added
to its report the statement that the noise abatement regulations
were not designed to deprive the local airport owner of the power
to regulate, without discrimination, the operations at his airport,
including the denial of use of aircraft noisier than those currently
operating there."7 Apparently the committee anticipated that airport operators would not, on the basis of noise abatement, curtail
use by aircraft currently using the facility. The committee report is
silent on the broad powers given the FAA to regulate aviation
noise control, but the matter was specifically addressed in the
House hearings." The general counsel'" for the Air Transport Association of America" pointed out that the proposed legislation not
only required the FAA to regulate the noise characteristics of new
equipment, but also gave the FAA broad powers to regulate present
operations for noise abatement. By disregarding such proposals to
regulate equipment design only, and by accepting the Secretary of
Transportation's assessment of the federal preemption of the field
of aviation noise abatement, Congress opted to imply pre-emption
rather than to address itself to the question of the states' police
power. As indicated above, the only qualification of the federal
at 5.
"Id. at 5, 6. The letter stated that:
[T]he courts have held that the Federal government presently preempts the field of noise regulation insofar as it involves controlling
the flight of aircraft. Local noise control legislation limiting the permissible noise level of all overflying aircraft has recently been
struck down because it conflicted with Federal regulation of air
traffic. [Citing American Airlines v. Town of Hempstead]. The legislation [the 1968 amendment] operates in an area committed to Federal care, and noise limiting rules operating as do those of the
ordinance must come from a Federal source. [The amendment]
would merely expand the Federal Government's role in a field
already preempted.
7
3 Id. at 6.
"Hearings on H.R. 3400 Before the Subcomm. on Transportation and Aeronautics of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. ser. 90-35 (1967).
"John E. Stephen, General Counsel, Air Transport Association of America.
' The members of the association are the scheduled airlines.
'id.
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regulation of aviation noise implied by the committee was the power
reserved to an airport operator to govern, on a nondiscriminatory
basis, the use of the facility. This qualification was apparently observed by the Court in Burbank, since the holding was limited to the
actions of state and local governments not as proprietors but as local
governments in exercise of the police power."'
The Supreme Court in Burbank concluded that there was federal pre-emption of the field of aviation noise control not because
aviation safety required it but solely because the federal statutory
scheme was so pervasive as to foreclose the possibility of compatible
state regulation. ' This finding is based on the determination that
congressional intent was to preempt the field as discussed above.'
The federal noise abatement statutes and the regulations promulgated thereunder are designed to cover the entire aviation industry
and not merely the design of new planes and equipment as the dissenting opinion suggests. The pervasive federal plan includes regulation of equipment design, flight regulations and techniques, runway and flight preference orders, and even approval of land use
and the physical layout of the airports themselves. This overall plan
would be unduly hobbled if there were differing local ordinances
affecting each airport.
An additional argument relied on by the majority was suggested
by the district court's postulation that if all airports in the country
were subject to a similar ordinance, there would be a threat to the
safety of interstate commerce caused by the natural tendency for
flights to "bunch" before and after the curfew hours." This reasoning is founded on the cumulative effect analysis that aggregates the
effects of the many localities and examines the overall effect on
interstate commerce on a national level." This analysis is especially
effective here to show the impact of cumulative local control as
opposed to an integrated and coordinated national plan for the
control of aviation noise. Noise control at the national level is interrelated with safety considerations, the economic regulation of
41411 U.S. at 635-36 n.14.

'411 U.S. at 633.
"'See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
44411 U.S. at 627-28.
4See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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carriers and routes, and the service available to shippers and
travelers.
The language of the congressional reports indicates that the
airport proprietor is free to limit use of his airport in the interest of
noise abatement just as he may limit the use of his airport by not
building longer runways capable of accommodating larger planes."
The congressional reports imply a right to refuse service to noisier
planes, but do not consider the possibility of an airport's refusing
service during certain hours to the same planes that it has served in
the past; thus such a refusal is apparently permissible. Whether the
holding in Burbank would permit such action by an airport proprietor is unclear. If the airport's refusal to serve aircraft at certain
times is found to interfere with the safety and free flow of interstate
commerce, or is found to be an undue burden on interstate commerce, that refusal might not stand in light of Burbank. One tends
to think not. The Supreme Court, following a tenet of construction,
decided only the limited case before it and did not consider the
broader interstate commerce questions potentially raised by Burbank."' It seems clear that interstate commerce is not to be the
victim of noise abatement actions by local government. The burden
of effective noise abatement, therefore, is on the FAA and the
federal response must be an effective compromise between the competing demands of the air carriers and those persons who live in the
flight paths and noise corridors near the nation's airports. The FAA
is in an unenviable position; aggressive noise control will be attacked
by the air carriers while agency inaction might spawn a rash of
divergent local airport rules disruptive to the industry and costly
to its customers. A less abrasive course for the FAA to pursue is
to issue uniform guidelines for noise abatement in current operations, to conduct additional but timely research efforts in search of
cost effective designs for quieter aircraft, and to closely scrutinize
both existing and proposed airports as well as the land use plans for
the surrounding land in order to seek novel solutions for noise
abatement problems.
Robert A. Sparks
4

6

4

S. REP. No. 1353, supra note 34, at 6.

Airports having governmental proprietors are by far in the majority over
privately owned or operated airports, as the Court pointed out. 411 U.S. at
635-36 n.14.
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